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Abstract 
Organizing and managing channels of distribution is an important marketing task. Due to the 
emergence of electronic commerce on the Internet, e-channel distribution systems have been 
adopted by many manufacturers. However, academic and anecdotal evidence both point to the 
pressures arising from this new e-channel manufacturing environment. Questions marks therefore 
remain on how the addition of this e-channel affects the traditional marketing strategies of leasing 
and selling. We set up several two-period dual-channel models in which a manufacturer sells a 
durable product through both a manufacturer-owned e-channel and an independent reseller (leaser) 
who adopts selling (leasing) to consumers. Our main results indicate that, direct selling cost aside, 
product durability plays an important role in shaping the strategies of all members. With either 
marketing strategy, the additional expansion of an e-channel territory may secure Pareto gains, in 
which all members benefit.  
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1. Introduction 
Exclusive channel territories are one of the oldest fields of marketing distribution scholarly 
activity (e.g. Bucklin, 1962; Cady, 1982). For years, organizing and managing distribution 
channels has been an integral part of contractual work of the manufacturer’s marketing strategy 
(Frazier & Rody, 1991; Dutta, Bergen, Heide, & John, 1995; Frazier, 1999). Exclusive territories 
would normally form part of the vertical restraint of members of the distribution channel, by 
which one member undertakes not to market his products in a geographical area (Bucklin, 1962; 
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Scherer, 1983; Dutta, Bergen, Heide, & John, 1995; Sass, & Saurman, 1993). However, traditional 
distribution channels and related strategies have been impacted by the emergence, disruption and 
transformational effects of the Internet and the creation of virtual marketplace opportunities. With 
the realignment of, or new investment in, associated technologies, the capacity of manufacturers to 
search for business and active sales outside that same market through e-channels has become an 
important way to minimize their costs, reach different customer segments and remain competitive 
(Moriarty & Moran, 1990). As consequence, many manufacturing firms, including Apple (Apple 
2013), HP (Hewlett-Packard 2013), and Lenovo (Lenovo 2013), have begun to distribute their 
products and reach their customers simultaneously through new e-channels, which are both 
integrated and independent (e.g. Dutta, Bergen, Heide, & John, 1995). As such, e-channels have 
re-set many of the exclusive clause contracts and relational business norms associated with 
traditional distribution channel strategies. With the Internet and e-channels, then, channel 
management is no longer bound or restricted to the traditional market geographies and distribution 
channels for leasing and selling.  
The addition of manufacturer-owned e-channels to traditional channels of selling and leasing 
channel practice, has, however, not been without its pressures, tensions and conflict (Webb & 
Lambe, 2007).  Academic and anecdotal evidence both point to the stresses arising from new 
e-channel environment where new and direct manufacturing channels have challenged exclusive 
channel territories, stability and resources, thereby threatening traditional channels and even whole 
business models (Wilson & Daniel, 2007). Webb & Lambe’s (2007) study show the potential 
conflict internal to the supplier firm among the groups and individuals responsible for managing 
the various channels. Anecdotal evidence suggests that channel members are negatively affected, 
for example, reports of HP’s resellers clashing with HP over direct sales encroachment. One 
channel member, Repton, explained that, “we are now nervous about engaging with certain HP 
people; they have taken business direct even though the deal was registered and approached some 
of our longest standing customers” (Carlow Microscope 2009).  
Despite the growing evidence of manufacturer multi-channel encroachment and the 
associated challenges and pressures, multiple channel systems have remained relatively under 
researched (Sharma and Mehrotra, 2007).  Recently several studies have been undertaken to 
understand different aspects of multiple channel systems and this initial research has called for 
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more research on modelling the channel designs/mixes (e.g. Webb & Lambe, 2007; Wilson & 
Daniel, 2007). Unlike previous research on durable goods that focuses on the marketing strategies 
of leasing and selling in a single-channel, however, we set up dual-channel models to understand 
how the addition of a manufacturer-owned e-channel impacts on the traditional marketing 
strategies of selling and leasing. The overall aim of this paper is therefore to examine the effects of 
manufacturer-owned e-channel choice on the traditional marketing channel strategies of selling 
and leasing, specifically accounting for the conditions – product durability, channel structure, and 
direct selling cost – under which firms choose a specific type of channel system. In particular, we 
intend to answer the following questions: How does the addition of an e-channel affect 
manufacturer’s and reseller’s (leasor’s) performance? What is the implication of product durability 
and the channel structure on channel members’ performance?  
As such, our paper makes a number of contributions. The first is that this study makes an 
important contribution to the literature on dual-channel supply chains (Arya et al. 2007; Xiong et 
al. 2012). We build on the dual-channel supply chains literature, extending the analysis of 
horizontal competition under different channel structures, empirically linking the different channel 
boundary conditions of product durability, channel structure and direct selling cost (Xiong et al. 
2012). Specifically our model extends and generalizes Arya et al. (2007)’s model to the durable 
goods setting (Bulow, 1986; Desai and Purohit, 1999; Huang et al. 2001; Agrawal et al. 2011). 
Furthermore, we build on Heide’s (2003) study and related research (Srinivasan, 2006) in 
modelling the impact of channel design/mix on performance. As Heide (2003, p.27) notes, “the 
specific performance implications of plural systems remain unanswered. Establishing a link 
between a particular governance approaches and outcome variables seems an important research 
priority.” Our model indicates that, direct selling cost aside, product durability plays an important 
role in shaping the optimal strategies of all members. Second, we build on the early empirical 
evidence on vertical restraints which offers several efficiency based explanations on the existence 
of exclusive territory agreements (Sass & Saurman, 1993). Significantly, our results show that the 
addition of an e-channel may secure Pareto gains, in which all members benefit from adding an 
e-channel, thus suggesting that a rising e-channel tide lifts all boats. Here we specify the nature of 
the efficiency gain, empirically linking them to different variables of interest. Third, we find that, 
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to reduce the competition from her
1
 intermediaries, the manufacturer may set a higher wholesale 
price (a price skimming strategy) to the reseller (leaser) in Period 1 (2) under a dual-channel 
supply chain. Although pricing is a major concern in channel strategies, it has received relatively 
little research attention. This study shows how price can be deployed as a heuristic device 
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011) as part of the manufacturers’ marketing strategy in order to 
enjoy the benefits e-channels. Finally, we show that, bearing the brunt of the e-channel, leasing 
may dominate selling. We show how the addition of e-channel brings Pareto gains, therefore 
adding to the literature which pays little attention on how this issue is affected by different 
marketing strategies (i.e., selling and leasing). This complements existing results that show that, 
unlike the optimum behavior of leasing by a durable goods monopolist, selling turns out to be the 
unique dominant strategy of the competing firms. Taken together, this lays the foundation for more 
specific research and analyses. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature 
and explains our contributions in more detail. Section 3 describes the key elements of our basic 
model and introduces notation. Section 4 outlines single-channel models and dual-channel models 
and reports our main findings. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Relevant Literature 
Beginning with an analysis of time inconsistency
2
 by Coase (1972), the relationship between 
leasing and selling has long been studied for durable goods. For example, Bulow (1982) 
considering a monopolist who sells a perfectly durable in a two-period market, shows that the 
monopolist can avoid the time inconsistency problem and has higher profitability by leasing. 
Desai and Purohit (1998) explore the strategy of leasing and selling in a two-period model, finding 
that the relative profitability of leasing and selling hinges on the rates at which leased and sold 
units depreciate. Poddar (2004) considers a simultaneous move game between two symmetric 
durable good firms and finds that selling turns out to be the unique dominant strategy of the firms. 
Bhaskaran and Gilbert (2009) examine the possibility that if the manufacturer sells its product, 
                                                        
1 Throughout this article, we use the feminine pronoun to refer to the manufacturer and the masculine pronoun to 
refer to the dealer (including the reseller and the leaser). 
2 Time inconsistency refers to a situation in which rational consumers, anticipating that the monopolist has an 
incentive to increase product availability and lower its price over time, postpone purchases until the price falls to a 
competitive level. This issue is formalized in Stokey (1981). 
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then the dealers can either sell or lease it to consumers, and show that, when the level of 
competition among dealers is high, the manufacturer prefers to lease rather than sell its product to 
the dealers. Agrawal et al. (2011) adopt a life-cycle environmental impact perspective and 
investigate if leasing can be both more profitable and have a lower total environmental impact; 
they find that leasing can be environmentally worse (despite remarketing all off-lease products) 
and greener than selling (despite the mid-life removal of off-lease products).
3
 Andrikopoulos and 
Markellos (2014) develop a model of dynamic interactions between price variations in leasing and 
selling markets for automobiles. Empirical analysis shows that variations in selling (cash) market 
prices lead rapidly dissipating changes of leasing market prices in the opposite direction. 
Bhaskaran and Sreekumar（2015）explore the interactions between channel structure (direct 
interaction with consumers vs. through an intermediary(ies)) and mode of operations (leasing vs. 
selling) and their implications for a manufacturer's willingness to invest in making her product 
more durable. The result means that if two changes together in channel structure and mode of 
operations may strengthen the manufacturer's willingness to invest in durability. 
 Although numerous researchers have focused on the marketing strategies of leasing and 
selling, most, if not all, studies traditionally assume that all goods are only distributed by dealers 
(i.e., resellers/leasers). However, with the investment in new technology, the manufacturers have 
increasingly the capacity of to search for business and active sales through manufacturer-owned 
e-channel (Moriarty & Moran, 1990). Literature on vertical restraints offers several 
efficiency-based arguments for the existence of exclusive territory agreements; that is not to 
search for business and active sales through manufacturer-owned e-channels. Most of these 
arguments relate to the incentives for the participants in the relationship, improved role 
performance and increase the manufacturer’s commitment to the relationship (Anderson & Weitz, 
1992; Sass & Saurman, 1993; Webb & Lambe, 2007; Wilson & Daniel, 2007).  
Related to these arguments, is the literature on dual-channel supply chains, which advances 
two arguments. The first argues that the manufacturer direct selling results in channel conflict, 
harming relationships and hurting channel members’ performance. Balasubramanian (1998), for 
example, analyzes the potential for retail stores to bear the brunt of direct entry and uses market 
coverage as leverage to control conflict between direct marketer and retailer. Lee et al. (2003) 
                                                        
3 For a thorough review of the literature on durable goods, see Waldman (2003). 
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propose several practical guidelines for controlling the conflict in a dual-channel supply chain. 
Cattani et al. (2006) liken a reseller facing manufacturer direct selling to the parable of boiling a 
frog: if the costs and average convenience of the manufacturer’s e-channel become more favorable 
over time, then the manufacturer will be in a position to use the e-channel to undercut the prices in 
the traditional channel and so “boil” the reseller. Dan et al. (2012) then shows that retail services 
strongly influence the manufacturer and the retailer’s pricing strategies. Rodriguez and Aydin 
(2015) characterize scenarios in which the manufacturer's and retailer's assortment preferences are 
in conflict. The result shows the manufacturer may prefer the retailer to carry items with high 
demand variability while the retailer prefers items with low demand variability. Panda et al. (2015) 
found that there is a severe price competition between the retail and online channel, and product 
compatibility has a significant impact on the pricing policy.The marketing literature has also 
analyzed some antecedents and consequences vertical constraints, with antecedents ranging from 
the manufacturer’s strategic brand positioning on quality (i.e., Fein & Anderson, 1997); positive 
relationship between coordination and support efforts (Frazier & Rody, 1991); the manufacturer’s 
position in the distribution channel in relation to the competition existing in the manufacturers’ 
market (Dutta et al.,1999) and the provided distributor services that could be free-ridable by other 
channel members (Frazier & Rody, 1991).  
The second research stream, including Chiang et al. (2003), Arya et al. (2007), Dumrongsiri 
et al. (2008), Cai (2010) and Xu et al. (2012), states that manufacturer encroachment brings Pareto 
gains and all channel members benefit from the encroachment. This efficiency-led approach 
proposes that e-channel encroachment improves the role performance of all of the members 
companies and thereby the efficiency of the channel as a whole.  In the marketing literature, 
studies find that exclusive territories agreements aim to create an incentives system for parties in 
the channel relationship (Frazier & Rody, 1991; Sass & Saurman, 1993), while a more 
anti-competitive led argument approach claims that exclusivity is used as a device to reduce 
competition and to extract monopoly rents from the market (Rey & Stiglitz, 1988, 1995).  
While this research starts to inform, in part, our understanding of the questions: i) How does 
the addition of an e-channel affect manufacturer’s and reseller’s (leasor’s) performance? and ii) 
What is the implication of product durability and the channel structure on channel members’ 
performance?, we also need to build on this work in a number of important respects. First, Model 
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RE in this paper reduces to Arya et al. (2007) when product durability goes to zero, thus it 
nests Arya et al. as a special case and generalizes it to the durable goods setting. Second, 
Xiong et al. (2012) assume that the product is perfectly durable and does not deteriorate over time, 
and thus they can not account for how product durability affects the interactions between a 
manufacturer and her dealers (including the reseller and the leaser). In contrast, we allow product 
deterioration over time and try to account for the strategic effects of product durability, channel 
structure, and direct selling cost, which can capture several characteristics salient in many of 
today’s durable goods markets. Third, Xiong et al. (2012) focus on an environment of the dealer 
adopts a mix of selling and leasing. We instead investigate the much more common marketing 
strategies that selling and leasing are adopted by resellers and leasers, respectively, and focus on 
how the addition of an e-channel affects on different marketing strategies of selling and leasing. 
 
3. Model development 
As in Arya et al. (2007) and Xiong et al. (2012), the sequence of the game between the 
manufacturer and the reseller is as follows: the manufacturer announces the wholesale price to the 
reseller (leaser), who then responds by determining the optimal units for selling (leasing). The 
manufacturer then chooses the units to be sold through the e-channel. 
3.1. Product 
To capture the durable nature of a product, we use a two-period model
4
 in which only new 
products are available in Period 1, but both new and used products (i.e., those “new” units 
marketed in Period 1 then classified as “used” in Period 2) are available in Period 2. As in Desai 
and Purohit (1998, 1999), we designate the durability of the products produced in Period 1 using a 
factor  ( 0 1  ). If 1  , the product is perfectly durable, meaning that in Period 2, used 
units are identical to new units. If 0  , the product is nondurable and deteriorates fully after 
one period of use. 
3.2. Manufacturer strategies 
The manufacturer’s problem is to maximize her profits by setting wholesale prices ( iw ) and 
                                                        
4 A two-period model not only allows us to study dynamic issues while retaining tractability but simplifies the 
presentation of our analysis (similar assumption is adopted by Desai and Purohit (1998, 1999), Bhaskaran and 
Gilbert (2009)). 
  8 
choosing units ( imq ) to sell through the e-channel. Here, 1,2i   denotes Period 1 or 2. As in 
Arya et al. (2007) and Xiong et al. (2012), for simplicity, we normalize her marginal cost of 
production to zero and assume that her marginal cost of selling on the e-channel is 0eC c  . 
3.3. Reseller (leaser) strategies 
The reseller (leaser) maximizes his profit by choosing irq ( ilq ). To ensure that the reseller 
(leaser) has an advantage in the distribution channel, like Arya et al. (2007) and Xiong et al. 
(2012), we assume that the reseller’s (leaser’s) unit marketing cost is 0rC   ( 0lC  ). 
3.4. Consumers 
We derive the inverse demand functions from the consumer utility functions. We refer the 
reader to Desai and Purohit (1998) and Agrawal et al. (2011) for the detailed derivation. Let lij be 
the price of the services provided by product j in period i, where ,j n u refers to, respectively, 
new products and used products. Then, the one-period prices for a new and a used product are 
given, respectively, by: 
 
1 1 ( ) 1
2 1 ( ) 1 2 ( ) 2
2 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 2
1
1 ( )
(1 )
n r l m
n r l m r l m
u r l r l m m
l q q
l q q q q
l q q q q


  
    
    
  (1) 
Because it is “new” when a product marketed in Period 1 and then classified as “used” in 
Period 2, its selling price in Period 1 is 1 1 2n n up l l  , where   is a discount factor denoting 
the cash flows received in Period 2. To simplify, we assume a zero discount rate and a discount 
factor 1  .5 Since the product produced in Period 2 provides only one period of service, there 
is no distinction between leasing and selling, and its selling price is 2 2n np l . 
4. Model analysis 
In this section, we will outline single-channel models and dual-channel models and report our 
main findings. 
4.1. Implications of the e-channel on selling  
                                                        
5 Although allowing the discount factor 0<ρ<1 increases the complexity of the analysis, all our results remain 
unaffected. 
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To analyze implications of the e-channel on the strategy of selling, we first look at Model R, see 
Fig. 1 (a), in which no e-channel is open and all products are sold through an independent reseller 
and then consider Model RE, see Fig. 1 (b), in which the manufacturer-owned e-channel opens. 
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(a) Model R                         (b) Model RE 
Fig. 1 Model R and Model RE 
4.1.1. Model R 
From Eq. (1), the inverse demand functions in Model R are as follows: 
 
1 1 2 1 1 2
2 2 1 2
1 (1 )
1
r n u r r r
r n r r
P l l q q q
P l q q


      
   
 (2) 
We use backward induction to determine the subgame perfect equilibrium. Specifically, the 
reseller maximized 2 2 2 2( )
R
r r rp w q   ,
6
 in Period 2 by choosing 
*
2
R
rq . Working backwards, 
plugging 
*
2
R
rq  into 2 2 2
R
r rw q   and solving the first-order condition yields 
*
2
R
rw . 
Given the optimal solution for Period 2, we look at the decisions in Period 1. The reseller’s 
problem is to maximize the total two period profit, that is, 
* *
1 2 1 1 1 2( )
R R R R
r r rp w q        , by choosing 
*
1
R
rq , and then the manufacturer maximizes 
the total two period profit, 
* *
1 2 1 1 2
R R R R
r rw q     , by choosing 
*
1
R
rw . We summarize 
both players’ optimal decisions in Lemma 1 in Appendix A. All proofs are provided in Appendix 
B. 
4.1.2. Model RE 
From Eq. (1), the purchase prices in Period 1 and 2 are: 
                                                        
6 We use lowercase 
k
i and uppercase
k
i  to represent the reseller’s (leaser’s) and manufacturer’s profit in 
period i under model k. 
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1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2
2 2 1 1 2 2
1 (1 )
1 ( )
r n u r m r r m m
r n r m r m
P l l q q q q q q
P l q q q q


         
     
 (3) 
In the Model RE, the manufacturer can sell products through an e-channel, therefore, the 
manufacturer’s problem is 
2
2 2 2 2 2 2max
m
RE
r r r m m
q
w q p q cq    . Given the manufacturer’s 
optimal quantities
*
2
RE
mq , then the reseller’s problem is 
2
2 2 2 2 2max
r
RE
r r r r
q
p q w q   . Observing 
the reseller’s response 
*
2
RE
rq , the manufacturer maximizes his profit ( 2
RE ) by choosing 2
RE
rw . 
In Period 1, each player’s objective is to maximize the profit from both periods, that is, 
1 1
1
*
1 1 1 1 1 2
,
*
1 1 1 1 2
max
max
m r
r
RE RE
r r r m m
q w
RE RE
r r r r
q
w q p q cq
p q w q 

    
  
 
Working backwards, we derive the optimal strategies of Model RE in Lemma 2 in Appendix 
A.  
Arya et al.’s (2007) outcome is identical to our result of Model RE for the fully deteriorated 
product, i.e., 0  . Said differently, when product durability 0  , the results in Lemma 2 is 
consistent with that in Arya et al. (2007), therefore, our model nests theirs as a special case. 
Based on Lemma 2, we find several interesting characteristics about channel members’ 
optimal strategies (see, Fig. 2): 
Proposition 1. (a) In model RE, the manufacturer opens the e-channel if and only if 1( )c c  . 
(b) In model RE, when 0c  , confronting the manufacturer encroachment, the reseller 
starts withdrawing from the market. 
From Proposition 1, we find that when the direct selling disadvantage is not significant, the 
manufacturer encroaches into the reseller’s market. This observation is partly consistent with that 
of Arya et al. (2007), who conclude that “the manufacturer will encroach, if and only if its retail 
cost disadvantage is not too pronounced” (P.654). However, we further find that durability plays 
an important role as well, for example, with product durability increases, the threshold 1( )c   
decreases (see Fig. 2).  
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Fig. 2. Optimal strategies under Model RE 
4.1.3. Model R vs. Model RE 
The following proposition summarizes the e-channel’s affects on equilibrium outcomes. 
Proposition 2. (a) The equilibrium quantities in Model RE are always higher than in Model R, 
that is, 2 2 2
RE RE R
r m rq q q   and 1 1 1
RE RE R
r m rq q q  . 
(b) In Period 2, the wholesale price in Model RE are always lower than in Model R, that is, 
2 2
RE R
r rw w , while in Period 1, when 2 ( )c c  , the manufacturer sets a higher wholesale price 
in Model RE than that in Model R (i.e., 1 1
RE R
r rw w ), but a lower wholesale price than Model R 
otherwise. 
Proposition 2 shows that, when the direct selling disadvantage c  is below 2 ( )c  , the 
manufacturer sets a higher wholesale price in Period 1 under Model RE. This can be interpreted as 
follows: 2 ( )c c   means that the direct selling disadvantage is insignificant and the 
competition between the reseller channel and manufacturer-owned e-channel is intense, which 
results in the manufacturer sets a higher wholesale price to reduce the competition from the 
reseller. Another interesting characteristic of the above proposition is that the manufacturer may 
set a lower wholesale price in Model RE, an observation supported by Xiong et al. (2012) and 
Arya et al. (2007). For example, Arya et al. (2007) conclude that “if this competitive advantage 
were not counterbalanced by a lower wholesale price, the advantage would reduce the output of 
the incumbent retailer unduly and thereby reduce its demand for the essential input” (P. 654).  
We now look at the difference in the profits under Model R and Model RE and our analysis 
suggests the following proposition (see, Fig 3): 
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Proposition 3. (a) The manufacturer is always better off in Model RE than in Model R, i.e., 
RE R  . 
(b) When 
3( )c c  , the reseller’s profit in Model RE is higher than in Model R, i.e., 
RE R  ; 
otherwise, the opposite is true. 
(c) When 4 1( ) ( )c c c    or 50 ( )c c   , the supply chain profit in Model RE is higher 
than that in Model R, i.e., 
RE R
T T   ; otherwise, the opposite is true. 
Proposition 3 shows that, when 3( )c c  , the direct selling disadvantage is pronounced, 
the competition from the manufacturer encroachment can be overcome by the reduction in the 
wholesale prices. As a result, the reseller can benefit from the manufacturer encroachment. 
Proposition 3 also shows that either when the direct selling disadvantage is sufficiently 
pronounced (i.e., 4 1( ) ( )c c c   ) or when it is insignificant (i.e., 50 ( )c c   ), the 
manufacturer’s direct selling increases the supply chain profit. The intuition behind this is that, 
when 50 ( )c c   , the direct selling disadvantage is so insignificant that the competition from 
the reseller is limited. As a result, the manufacturer’s profit increasing is substantial, which 
overcomes the loss of the reseller’s profit. Said differently, the direct selling can enhance supply 
chain profit even when it reduces the reseller’s profit. On the other hand, when 
4 1( ) ( )c c c   , the manufacturer’s direct selling can secure Pareto gains: the manufacturer 
obtains more profit by direct selling and the reseller benefits from the wholesale price decreasing. 
We note that Arya et al. (2007) also conclude that “When the retailer’s cost advantage is 
sufficiently pronounced, the retailer benefits from encroachment.” and “encroachment will 
increase the supply chain profit either when the retailer’s downstream cost advantage is 
sufficiently pronounced or when it is sufficiently limited” (P. 654). We further find, however, that 
durability plays an important role, for example (see, Fig. 3), with product durability increases, the 
thresholds of 3( )c   and 4 ( )c   increases, but 5( )c   decreases. 
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Fig. 3 
RE R   and RE RT T   
4. 2. Implications of the e-channel on leasing  
To analyze implications of the e-channel on the strategy of leasing, we first look at Model L, see 
Fig. 4 (a), in which no e-channel is open and all products are leased through an independent leaser 
and then consider Model LE, see Fig. 4 (b), in which the manufacturer-owned e-channel opens. 
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(a) Model L                         (b) Model LE 
Fig. 4 Model L and Model LE 
4.2.1. Model L 
From Eq. (1), the inverse demand functions in Model L are as follows: 
 
1 1
2 1 2
2 1 2
1
1
(1 )
n l
n l l
u l l
l q
l q q
l q q


 
  
  
 (4) 
In Period 2, the leaser’s problem is to choose optimal quantities (
*
2
L
lq ) to maximize his profits, 
2 2 2 2 2 1( )
L
n l l u ll w q l q    . Given the optimal 
*
2
L
lq , the manufacturer optimizes profits by 
choosing 
*
2
L
lw , that is, by maximizing 2 2 2
L
l lw q  . 
In Period 1, the leaser’s problem is to maximize the total two period profit, that is, 
* *
1 2 1 1 1 2( )
L L L L
n l ll w q        , by choosing 
*
1
L
lq , and then the manufacturer maximizes 
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the total two periods profits, 
* *
1 2 1 1 2
L L L L
l lw q     , by choosing 
*
1
L
lw . Using 
backward induction again, we get the Lemma 3 in Appendix A. 
4.2.2. Model LE 
We now analyze Model LE in which the manufacturer sells the products through both a 
manufacturer-owned e-channel and an independent leaser who then leases to consumers.  
From Eq. (1), the purchase prices in Period 1 and 2 are: 
 
1 1 1
2 1 1 2 2
2 1 2 1 2
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2
2 2 1 1 2 2
1
1 ( )
(1 )
1 (1 )
1 ( )
n l m
n l m l m
u l l m m
r n u l m l l m m
r n l m l m
l q q
l q q q q
l q q q q
P l l q q q q q q
P l q q q q




  
    
    
         
     
 (5) 
In the Model LE, the manufacturer’s problems in Period 2 and Period 1, respectively, are:  
 
2 2
1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
,
*
1 1 1 1 1 2
,
max
max
m l
m l
LE
l l r m m
q w
LE LE
l l r m m
q w
w q p q cq
w q p q cq


   
    
 (6) 
The leaser’s problems are:  
 
2
1
2 2 2 2 1 2 2
*
1 1 1 1 2
max
max
l
l
LE
n l u l l l
q
LE LE
n l l l
q
l q l q w q
l q w q

 
  
  
 (7) 
 
Using backward induction, we derive the optimal strategies of Model LE in Lemma 4 in 
Appendix A. 
Based on Lemma 4, we have the following proposition (see, Fig. 5): 
Proposition 4. (a) In model LE, the manufacturer opens the e-channel if and only if 6 ( )c c  . 
(b) In model LE, when 7 ( )c c  , confronting the manufacturer encroachment, the leaser starts 
withdrawing from the market in Period 2. 
Similar Proposition 1, we find that when the direct selling disadvantage is not significant, the 
manufacturer encroaches into the leaser’s market. However, we further find that, in Model LE, 
with product durability increases, the threshold at which the leaser starts withdrawing from the 
market increases. While in Model RE, similar to that of Arya et al. (2007), the threshold for the 
reseller starts withdrawing from the market is 0c  . Fig. 5 illustrates these results.  
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Fig. 5. Optimal strategies under Model LE 
4.2.3. Model L vs. Model LE 
As before, we look first at the affects of the e-channel on equilibrium outcomes under both 
models. 
Proposition 5. (a) The equilibrium quantities in Model LE are always higher than in Model L, that 
is, 2 2 2
LE LE L
l m lq q q   and 1 1 1
LE LE L
l m lq q q  . 
(b) In Period 1, the wholesale price in Model LE is always lower than in Model L, that is, 
1 1
LE L
l lw w , while in Period 2, when 8( )c c  , the manufacturer sets a higher wholesale price 
in Model LE but a lower wholesale price than in Model L otherwise. 
Proposition 5 shows that, in contrast to Model RE, in which the manufacturer may set a 
higher wholesale price in Period 1, the manufacturer here always sets a lower wholesale price in 
Period 1, while she may provide a higher wholesale price in Period 2. The reason for this reversal 
is that, in Period 2, for the manufacturer, the impacts from the strategies of leasing and selling are 
identical, because Period 2 is the last period of the market and all new products, provide 
one-period use. Note that, in Period 1, the wholesale price in Model LE is lower than in Model L 
(i.e., 1 1
LE L
l lw w ). To “compensate” for the profit “loss” in Period 1 and to reduce the competition 
from the leaser, the manufacturer sets a higher wholesale price in Period 2. 
We now look at the difference in profits under Model L and Model LE (see, Fig 6): 
Proposition 6. (a) The manufacturer is always better off in Model LE than in Model L, i.e., 
LE L  . 
(b) When 9 ( )c c  , the reseller’s profit in Model LE is higher than in Model L, i.e., 
LE L  ; 
otherwise, the opposite is true. 
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(c) When 10 6( ) ( )c c c    or 110 ( )c c   , the supply chain profit in Model LE is higher 
than that in Model L; otherwise, the opposite is true. 
Obviously, similar Proposition 3, the above proposition shows that, under certain conditions, 
the manufacturer encroachment may achieve Pareto gains.  
 
Fig. 6 
LE L   and LE L   
4.3. Comparing implications on selling and leasing 
In this section, we provide insights into different implications of the e-channel on marketing 
strategies of selling and leasing. 
Based on Lemma 2 and 4, we first compare all parties’ performance under Model RE and 
Model LE (see, Fig. 7): 
Proposition 7. (a) if 12 ( )c c  , the leaser has a higher profit than the reseller, i.e., 
LE RE  ; 
otherwise, the opposite is true. 
(b) if 12 ( )c c  , the manufacturer is better off in Model LE, that is, 
LE RE  ; otherwise, 
the opposite is true. 
 
Fig. 7 
RE LE   and RE LE   
Before explaining Proposition 7, we must briefly analyze the manufacturer’s profit, in 
dual-channel models, which comes from two sources: wholesaling products to the reseller (leaser) 
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and selling through her own e-channel. And recalling that, because of retaining ownership of the 
products, to mitigate the cannibalization problem between used and new goods, the leaser is more 
likely to provide a smaller quantity of units than the reseller.  
Proposition 7 can thus be interpreted as follows: anticipating that the leaser provides a 
smaller quantity of units than the reseller, the manufacturer sets a higher wholesale price for the 
reseller than that for the leaser. She does so for two reasons: first, anticipating that the leaser is 
more likely to provide a smaller quantity of units than the reseller (which means that the 
manufacturer’s potential market is larger and the marginal revenues in the retail channel is higher) 
the manufacturer sets a lower wholesale price to show “appreciation” for the leaser’s 
“coordination” and to avoid reducing the leaser’s profit unduly.  Second, because the reseller 
sells a higher quantity of units, in order to reduce the competition from the reseller and to have a 
larger potential market, the manufacturer sets a higher wholesale price to him. As a result, 
compared with the reseller’s selling, the leaser’s leasing achieves a win-win result: the 
manufacturer obtains more profit by direct selling and the leaser benefits from the wholesale price 
decreasing. 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, “in a competition situation, selling turns out to be the 
unique dominant strategy of the firms”
7
, Proposition 7 implies that under certain conditions, 
bearing the brunt of the e-channel, leasing dominates selling. We believe this difference stems 
from our focus on the competition between the upstream manufacturer and the downstream dealer 
rather than the competition between two manufacturers. On the other hand, our observation differs 
from those of Bucovetsky and Chilton (1986) and Xiong et al. (2012), who argued that “in 
presence of threat of entry, an optimal pre-entry contract is a mix of renting and selling”, a 
difference that we do not allow the dealer chooses both renting and selling together. 
We are now in a position to address the question posed at the beginning of this paper: How 
does the addition of an e-channel affect manufacturer’s and reseller’s (leaser’s) performance? To 
answer this question, we need compare the variations in all parties’ profitability under Model R 
and Model RE with that under Model L and Model LE. For simplicity, we use 
                                                        
7
 See Ausubel and Deneckere (1989); Von der Fehr and Kuhn (1995); Biehl (2001) and Poddar (2004) for related 
results. 
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( ) ( ) ( )R L RE LE R L      and ( ) ( ) ( )R L RE LE R L    to denote the variations in the 
reseller’s (leaser’s) and manufacturer’s profitability under strategies of selling and leasing, 
respectively.  
Based on Lemma 1, 2, 3 and 4, we answer the above question as follows (see Fig. 8): 
Proposition 8. (a) when 13 10( ) ( )c c c   , the manufacturer’s direct selling adds more 
pressure on leasing (i.e., 
L R    ); otherwise, the e-channel provides more pressure on 
selling, that is, 
R L    . 
(b) when 14 ( )c c  , the manufacturer benefits more on leasing than on selling by adding an 
e-channel (i.e., 
L R   ); otherwise, the opposite is true. 
 
Fig. 8 Variations in the profits 
The conventional wisdom suggests that, because the leasers retain ownership of the products 
for themselves, which means manufacturer’s direct selling not only impacts the leasers’ revenue 
from the new products but also affects the revenues from the ex-leased units. As a result, the 
manufacturer’s direct selling adds more pressure on its leasers. Said differently, the 
manufacturer-owned e-channel is more harmful to leasing than to selling. This logic, though, 
misses a key point: the manufacturer can alter her preferred wholesale price.  
Proposition 8 shows that, see Fig. 8, when 13( )c c  , the e-channel provides more pressure 
on selling and hurts the reseller more than the leaser. This is because, in order to reduce the 
competition from the reseller and to have a larger potential market, the manufacturer sets a higher 
wholesale price to him. Said differently, the selling achieves more difficult position to the reseller, 
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because he not only needs to compete with the products from e-channel, but also needs to bear 
higher wholesale prices than leaser. 
Proposition 8 also shows that, see Fig. 8, when 14 ( )c c  , the manufacturer benefits more 
on leasing than on selling by adding an e-channel; otherwise, the opposite is true. The reason 
behind this is as follows, indeed when 14 ( )c c  , as explanation of Proposition 7 shows, the 
leaser’s leasing achieves a win-win result: the manufacturer obtains more profit by direct selling 
and the leaser benefits from the wholesale price decreasing. However, when 14 ( )c c  , most of 
the manufacturer’s profit drives from wholesaling, the manufacturer can benefit from selling than 
leasing, because the reseller provides more quantity of products to consumers, i.e., 
R L   . 
5. Conclusion 
Organizing and managing channels of distribution is an important marketing activity for 
manufacturers. Due to the emergence of electronic commerce on the Internet, e-channel 
distribution systems have been adopted by many manufacturers. However, this has not been 
without many complications within and across distribution channel systems. Although the 
marketing issues associated with leasing and selling have been well studied in the literature on 
durable goods, little is known about how these marketing strategies are impacted by 
manufacturers’ adoption of e-channels and a more direct selling approach to the market. To fill this 
void, we develop a two-period model to investigate how the addition of a manufacturer e-channel 
impacts on the strategies of selling and leasing. 
 Our model extends and generalizes Arya et al. (2007)’s model to the durable goods setting. 
Specifically, we develop two-period models, in which a manufacturer sells a durable product 
directly through both a manufacturer-owned e-channel and an independent reseller (leaser) who 
adopts a strategy of selling (leasing) to consumers, to account for the strategic effects of product 
durability, channel structure, and direct selling cost. Our model thus captures several 
characteristics salient in many of today’s durable goods markets. 
We find that, direct selling cost aside, product durability plays an important role in shaping 
the optimal strategies of all members. As in Arya et al. (2007) and Xiong et al. (2012), our results 
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also show that the addition of an e-channel may secure Pareto gains, in which all members benefit 
from adding an e-channel to the single-channel supply chain. Among other results, we find that, to 
reduce the competition from her intermediaries, the manufacturer may set a higher wholesale price 
to the reseller (leaser) in Period 1 (2). Moreover, contrary to that of Ausubel and Deneckere 
(1989); Von der Fehr and Kuhn (1995); Biehl (2001) and Poddar (2004), “unlike the optimum 
behavior of leasing by a durable goods monopolist, selling turns out to be the unique dominant 
strategy of the competing firms”, we show that, bearing the brunt of the e-channel, leasing may 
dominate selling. 
We acknowledge the limitations of our model. First, such assumptions as the monopoly 
manufacturer, complete information, and no service competition, could be relaxed. Second, the 
reseller (leaser) sells (leases) to consumers at brick-and-mortar stores, an assumption that, 
although common in the literature of dual-channel supply chain (e.g., Tsay and Agrawal (2004), 
Arya et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2012), and Xiong et al. (2012)), does not reflect the reality that 
many resellers have ventured into the online world. Third, we assume that the e-channel only 
distributed new products at a normal price, whereas in reality, the use of e-channel also serves the 
purpose of being a secondary market.
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Lemma 1. In Model R, the equilibrium quantities, wholesale price, and profits, respectively, 
are
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Lemma 2. In Model RE, the equilibrium quantities, wholesale price, and profits, respectively, 
are
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9 8 4 2 24 12
18 24 24
RE
r
c c c c
w
    
 
     

 
, 
2
2 2
*
4 3 22( 4 3 12 8)
9( 2 2)
RE c   



   
 
 , 
6 4 2 6 6 5 2 5 5 4* 21 (27 72 47 54 224 240 144 84 720
36
RE cc c c c                  
4 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 248 504 1008 1144 24 4 180 1488c c c c c c                
2 2 1 2 21248 672 288 576 )(3 4 4) ( 2 2)c c c             . 
 
Lemma 3. In Model L, the equilibrium quantities, wholesale price, and profits, respectively, 
are
*
2
2
2
5 4 8
16( 2 2 )
L
lq
 
 
 
 
 , 
2
*
2 2
5 4 8
8( 2 2 )
L
lw
 
 
 

 
, 
*
1 2
4
8(2 2 )
L
lq

  


, 
3 2
*
1 2
11 36 8 16
16( 2 2)
L
lw
  
 
  

 
, 
4 2
*
3
2 2
15 224 128 68 20
256( 2 2 )
L    
 

   
 
 , 
2
2
* (7 24 32)
64( 2 2 )
L  
 
 
 
  . 
 
Lemma 4. In Model LE, the equilibrium quantities, wholesale price, and profits, respectively, 
are
5 6 6 5 4* 4 3 3
2 (1032 207 237 1378 1092 408 4232 310
1
8
6
LE
m c c cq c               
2 2 1 1420 2252 5976 3240 1296 2160 )(3 2) (2 )c c c               
2 1 2 1(23 54 54) ( 2 2)        , 
*
4 3
2 22
3 22(15 62 3 20 180 108 )
3(23 54 54)( 2 2)
LE
l
c c c
q
c c    
   
    
   
 , 
4 4 3 3 2 2
*
2 2
57 207 280 654 134 438 972 468 216 648
6(23 54 54)(3 2)(2 )
LE
l
c c c c c
w
       
   
        

   
, 
5 4 4 3 3 2 2
*
1 2 2
2(102 583 90 692 318 720 6 648 816 324 540 )
3(3 2)(2 )(23 54 54)( 2 2)
LE
m
c c c c c c
q
        
     
         
     

  25 
, 
3 2
*
1
2
2 2
2(8 38 3 28 36 )
(23 54 54)( 2 2)
LE
l
c c c
q
c   
   
   
   
 , 
* 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 4
1
1
(357 621 2592 2250 1848 3328 12228 2684
18
LE
lw c c c c              
      
3 3 2 26 8 0 4 6 0 4 4 1 9 4 4 1 5 4 0 8 1 5 5 5 2 3 1 6 8 1 2 9 6 3 8 8 8 )c c c c              
1 1 2 1 2 1( 2) (3 2) (23 54 54) ( 2 2)              ,  
4 2 7 7 6 5 4 9 8* 2 (474816 9360 306 18 648 324 432 3684
9
LE c c c c                
 
8 2 7 2 6 2 5 2 10 2 9 29560 76840 186832 130848 1011 8268c c c c c c          
8 3 2 2 2 2 2 6 581 255456 422640 399168 93312 768 21696c c c c c c             
 
4 3 2 1 1 2 2 2 24320 21600 7776 )(3 2) ( 2) (23 54 54) ( 2 2)c c c                    ,  
6 6 6 2 5 2 5 5* 41 ( 1242 621 825 3096 3528 5760 2124
36
LE c c c c               
4 4 2 3 3 2 3 2 21392 6352 12744 28072 26544 5436 360c c c c c              
2 2 2 24148 19440 37872 33696 7776 15552 18144 )c c c c c               
1 1 2 1 2 1( 3 2 ) ( 2 ) ( 2 3 5 4 5 4 ) ( 2 2 )              . 
 
Appendix B 
A. Proof of Lemma 1.  
Plugging (2) into 2 2 2 2( )
R
r r rp w q    and solving the first-order condition yields 
* 1 2
2
1
2
R r r
r
q w
q
 
  
After substituting (2), and 
*
2
R
rq , the problem of the manufacturer is given by: 
2
1 2
2
1
max
2r
r r
r
w
q w
w
 
, by applying FOCs to it with respect to 2rw , we can obtain 
* 1
2
1
2
R r
r
q
w

  
Plugging (2), 
*
2
R
rq  and 
*
2
R
rw  into 
1
* *
1 2 1 1 1 2( )
r
R R R R
r r r
q
p w q         and solving the 
first-order condition yields 1
*
1 2
8 8 5
16 16 5
rR
rq
w 
 
 

 
 . 
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Plugging (2), 
*
2
R
rq , 
*
2
R
rw  and 
*
1
R
rq  into 
1
* *
1 2 1 1 2
r
R R R R
r r
w
w q      and solving the 
first-order condition yields 
*
1
3 2
2
45 56 240 128
32(3 8 8)
R
rw
  
 
  

 
 . 
Substituting 
*
1
R
rw  into 
*
2
R
rq , 
*
2
R
rw , 
*
1
R
rq  and the profits of all members provides the 
equilibrium outcomes in Lemma 1. 
 
B. Proof of Lemma 2.  
Plugging (3) into 
2
2 2 2 2 2 2max
m
RE
r r r m m
q
w q p q cq     and solving the first-order 
condition yields 
* 1 1 2
2
1
2
RE r m r
m
q q q c
q
    
  
Plugging (3) and 
*
2
RE
mq  into 
2
2 2 2 2 2max
r
RE
r r r r
q
p q w q    and solving the first-order 
condition yields 
* 1 1 2
2
1
2
RE r m l
r
c q q w
q
    
  
Plugging (3), 
*
2
RE
mq  and 
*
2
RE
rq  into 
2
2 2 2 2 2 2max
r
RE
r r r m m
w
w q p q cq     and solving the 
first-order condition yields 
* 1 1
2
3 3 3
6
RE r m
r
c q q
w
   
  
Plugging (3), 
*
2
RE
mq , 
*
2
RE
rq  and 
*
2
RE
rw  into 
1
*
1 1 1 1 1 2max
m
RE RE
r r r m m
q
w q p q cq      
and solving the first-order condition yields 
2
1 1 1
2
*
1
2(3 3 2 3 3 3 )
3(4 4 3 )
m
rR rE rq q cq
c q  
 
    


 . 
Plugging (3), 
*
2
RE
mq , 
*
2
RE
rq , 
*
2
RE
rw and 
*
1
RE
mq  into 
1
*
1 1 1 1 2max
r
RE RE
r r r r
q
p q w q     and 
solving the first-order condition yields 
3 3 2 2
1 1 1*
3 41
24 24 24 8 12 9 12 10 18
6(4 8 4 )
r r rRE
m
c w w c c c
q
w      
  
        

  
 . 
Plugging (3), 
*
2
RE
mq , 
*
2
RE
rq , 
*
2
RE
rw , 
*
1
RE
mq  and 
*
1
RE
rq into 
1
*
1 1 1 1 1 2max
r
RE RE
r r r m m
w
w q p q cq      and solving the first-order condition yields 
3 3 2
2
*
1
9 8 2 24 4 12
6(3 4 4)
RE
r
c c c c
w
    
 
     

 
 . 
Substituting 
*
1
RE
rw  into 
*
2
RE
mq , 
*
2
RE
rq , 
*
2
R
rw , 
R *
1
E
mq , 
*
1
RE
rq  and the profits of all members 
provides the equilibrium outcomes in Lemma 2. 
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C. Proof of Proposition 1.  
This proof follows from optimal decisions in Lemma 2. 
(a) We find that, when 
2 2
14 2 3
3( 2 2)(3 2 4)
( )
11 76 6 42 40
c c
   

   
   

   
 , the manufacturer opens the 
e-channel (
*
2 0
RE
mq  ). 
(b) We find that, when 0c  , *2 0
RE
rq  ; otherwise, 
*
2 0
RE
rq  , that is, when 0c  , the reseller 
starts withdrawing from the market. 
 
D. Proof of Proposition 2.  
This proof follows from the equilibrium outcomes in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. 
(a) Comparing the equilibrium quantities 2 2
RE RE
r mq q  ( 1 1
RE RE
r mq q ) with 2
R
rq  ( 1
R
rq ), we find that, 
2 2 2
RE RE R
r m rq q q   ( 1 1 1
RE RE R
r m rq q q  ). 
(b) Comparing 2
RE
rw  ( 1
RE
rw ) with 2
R
rw  ( 1
R
rw ), we find that, 2 2
RE R
r rw w , and there exists a 
critical value, 
2 3 4
5 2 6 42 3
6 (36 72 2 34 9 )
1206 1708 3288 213 1100 2752 1008
( )c
    
     

    
     
 , when 2 ( )c c  , 
1 1
RE R
r rw w ; otherwise, 1 1
RE R
r rw w . 
 
E. Proof of Proposition 3.  
This proof follows from the equilibrium outcomes in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. 
(a) Comparing the equilibrium quantities 
RE  with R , we find that, RE R  . 
(b) Comparing 
RE  with R , we find that, there exists a critical value, 
4 3 2 3 2 4 1/2 2 2 1
3 48 2(( 4 3 12 8)( 864 848 3840 2048 99 )) ( 2 2 )(3 8 8)( )c            
            
4 3 2 1(512 2048 1536 6144 4096)        , when 3( )c c  , 
RE R  ; otherwise, RE R  . 
(c) Comparing 
RE RE  with R R  , we find that, there exists two critical values, 
6 5 4 3 2
4
2 41 (10368 52992 768 236544 12288 319488 147456 48(29104128 3227891
2
) 2(c               
3 5 6 11 12 7 912686336 28100032 14435920 2844 16605 14069696 2348760            
8 10 1/2 2 2 14696964 13008896 890880 1835008) )( 2 2 )(3 8 8)                
6 5 4 3 2 1(4544 22528 3840 105984 6400 136192 59392)            , and  
6 5 4 3 2
5
2 41 (10368 52992 768 236544 12288 319488 147456 48(29104128 3227891
2
) 2(c               
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3 5 6 11 12 7 912686336 28100032 14435920 2844 16605 14069696 2348760            
8 10 1/2 2 2 14696964 13008896 890880 1835008) )( 2 2 )(3 8 8)                
6 5 4 3 2 1(4544 22528 3840 105984 6400 136192 59392)            , when 
4 1( ) ( )c c c    or 50 ( )c c   , the supply chain profit 
RE RE R R    ; 
otherwise, the opposite is true. 
 
F. Proof of Lemma 3.  
Plugging (4) into 2 2 2 2 2 1( )
L
n l l u ll w q l q     and solving the first-order condition yields 
* 1 2
2
1 2
2
L l l
l
q w
q
 
  
After substituting (4), and 
*
2
L
lq , the problem of the manufacturer is given by: 
2
1 2
2
1 2
max
2l
l l
l
w
q w
w
 
, by applying FOCs to it with respect to 2lw , we can obtain 
* 1
2
1 2
2
L l
l
q
w

  
Plugging (4), 
*
2
L
lq  and 
*
2
L
lw  into 
1
* *
1 2 1 1 1 2( )
l
L L L L
n l l
q
l w q         and solving the 
first-order condition yields 1
2
*
1
3 4 4
2(4 4 )
L
l
w
q

 
 

 
 . 
Plugging (4), 
*
2
L
lq , 
*
2
L
lw  and 
*
1
L
lq  into 
1
* *
1 2 1 1 2
l
L L L L
l l
w
w q      and solving the 
first-order condition yields 
3
1
2
2
* 11 36 8 16
16( 2 2 )
L
lw
  
 
  

 
 . 
Substituting 
*
1
L
lw  into 
*
2
L
lq , 
*
2
L
lw , 
*
1
L
lq  and the profits of all members provides the 
equilibrium outcomes in Lemma 3. 
 
G. Proof of Lemma 4.  
Plugging (5) into 
2
2 2 2 2 2 2max
m
LE
l l r m m
q
w q p q cq     and solving the first-order condition 
yields 
* 1 1 2
2
1
2
LE l m l
m
q q q c
q
    
 , 
Plugging (5) and 
*
2
LE
mq  into 
2
2 2 2 2 1 2 2max
r
LE
n l u l l l
q
l q l q w q     and solving the first-order 
condition yields 
* 1 1 2
2
1
2
LE l m l
l
c q q w
q
    
 , 
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Plugging (5), 
*
2
LE
mq  and 
*
2
LE
lq  into 
2
2 2 2 2 2 2max
l
LE
l l r m m
w
w q p q cq     and solving the 
first-order condition yields 
* 1 1
2
3 4 3
6
LE l m
l
c q q
w
   
  
Plugging (5), 
*
2
LE
mq , 
*
2
LE
lq  and 
*
2
LE
lw  into 
1
*
1 1 1 1 1 2max
m
LE LE
l l r m m
q
w q p q cq      
and solving the first-order condition yields 
21
1 1 1*
27 4 6 6 6 6
3(4 4 3 )
lE
m
lL lq c c qq
q  
 
    

 
 . 
Plugging (5), 
*
2
LE
mq , 
*
2
LE
lq , 
*
2
LE
lw and 
*
1
LE
mq  into 
1
*
1 1 1 1 2max
l
LE LE
n l l l
q
l q w q     and 
solving the first-order condition yields 
3 2 3 2
1 1 1
4 2 3
*
1
36 3 72 54 72 32 27 36 72 22
2(9 36 2 72 34 )
LE l l l
l
c w w c
q
w c c      
   
     
  
  
  . 
Plugging (5), 
*
2
LE
mq , 
*
2
LE
lq , 
*
2
LE
lw , 
*
1
LE
mq and 
*
1
LE
lq  into 
1
*
1 1 1 1 1 2max
l
LE LE
l l r m m
w
w q p q cq      and solving the first-order condition yields 
7 7 6 5 4* 6 5
1
1
(357 621 2592 2250 1848 3328 12228
18
LE
l c c cw             
4 3 3 2 22684 6804 6044 1944 15408 15552 3168 1296c c c c c                
6 5 4 3 2 13888)(69 392 332 1016 572 1296 432)             . 
Substituting 
*
1
LE
lw  into 
*
2
LE
mq , 
*
2
LE
lq , 
*
2
LE
lw , 
*
1
LE
mq , 
*
1
LE
lq  and the profits of all members 
provides the equilibrium outcomes in Lemma 4. 
 
H. Proof of Proposition 4.  
This proof follows from optimal decisions in Lemma 4. 
(a) We find that, when 
6 4 5 3 2
66 5 4 3 2
3(69 136 344 1036 140 1080 432)
( )
237 1378 1092 4232 2252 5976 2160
cc
     

     
     

     
 , the 
manufacturer opens the e-channel (
*
2 0
LE
mq  ). 
(b) We find that there exists a critical value, 
47
3
3 2
3
15 62 20 1
( )
80 108
c

   

   
 , when 
7 ( )c c  , 
*
2 0
LE
lq  ; otherwise, 
*
2 0
LE
lq  , that is, when 7 ( )c c  , the leaser starts 
withdrawing from the market in Period 2. 
 
I. Proof of Proposition 5.  
This proof follows from the equilibrium outcomes in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. 
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(a) Comparing the equilibrium quantities 2 2
LE LE
l mq q  ( 1 1
LE LE
l mq q ) with 2
L
lq  ( 1
L
lq ), we find that, 
2 2 2
LE LE L
l m lq q q   ( 1 1 1
LE LE L
l m lq q q  ). 
(b) Comparing 2
LE
lw  ( 1
LE
lw ) with 2
L
lw  ( 1
L
lw ), we find that, 1 1
LE L
l lw w  ; and there exists a 
critical value, 
4 3 2 6 5
5 3 48 2 6 7
3 (2318 6680 5088 8928 2592 621 3126 )
8(3328 6044 1944 2250 357 3168 1296 2684
( )
)
c
      
     



     
      
, when 8( )c c  , 
2 2
LE L
l lw w ; otherwise, 2 2
LE L
l lw w . 
 
J. Proof of Proposition 6.  
This proof follows from the equilibrium outcomes in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. 
(a) Comparing the equilibrium quantities 
LE  with L , we find that, LE L  . 
(b) Comparing 
LE  with L , we find that, there exists a critical value, 
2 5 6 7 8 9 4 3
9
1
(3981312 11108352 393216 4792320 1886208 221184 22118( ) 40 11059200
2
c              
2 4 3 596(8819462062080 2116748630016 13392227819520 18703415808000      
6 11 1215671382838272 278628139008 2285906678528 2498220801696       
17 20 19 18 1315037686912 48133710 902043072 6283751376 1090461701888        
16 15 14 737302592776 276600397856 316861457856 10684931867136        
9 8 10 1/24480236638208 15181519996032 2515392921600 8010597677824 ) )      
4 6 5 3 2(243105792 95657984 66994176 130793472 216391680 204374016         
7 8 9 10 147775744 39342080 4894720 4233216 517632 )         , when 9 ( )c c  , 
LE L  ; otherwise, LE L  . 
(c) Comparing 
LE LE   with L L  , we find that, there exists two critical values, 
5 4 3
1
2 7
0
8( 108478464 552480768 281788416 467306496
1
( ) 66994176 3356467
2
2c              
9 10 616206336 1828224 107495424 447897600 241499136 48(975198486528        
2 4 3 539312097763328 21201744743424 69051360743424 103862582470656      
6 11 12 16117015589324800 4401973467904 26731202768272 163151540580      
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17 20 19 18 13333695359704 548767143 11408569848 92958565536 5398938263616        
15 14 7 92454413485232 5569297462912 48833163728640 8626694923648      
8 10 1/2121365459983552 9918387781632 70834170203136 ) )      
4 6 5 3 2(805064704 309561856 244125696 478900224 720552960         
7 8 9 10 1716967936 173187072 131136512 15781376 14070528 1732032 )          
, and 
5 4 3
1
2 7
1
8( 108478464 552480768 281788416 467306496
1
( ) 66994176 3356467
2
2c              
9 10 616206336 1828224 107495424 447897600 241499136 48(975198486528        
2 4 3 539312097763328 21201744743424 69051360743424 103862582470656      
6 11 12 16117015589324800 4401973467904 26731202768272 163151540580      
17 20 19 18 13333695359704 548767143 11408569848 92958565536 5398938263616        
15 14 7 92454413485232 5569297462912 48833163728640 8626694923648      
8 10 1/2121365459983552 9918387781632 70834170203136 ) )      
4 6 5 3 2(805064704 309561856 244125696 478900224 720552960         
7 8 9 10 1716967936 173187072 131136512 15781376 14070528 1732032 )          
, when 10 6( ) ( )c c c    or 110 ( )c c   , the supply chain profit 
LE LE L L    ; 
otherwise, the opposite is true. 
 
K. Proof of Proposition 7.  
This proof follows from optimal decisions in Lemma 2 and Lemma 4. 
Comparing 
RE ( RE ) with LE  ( LE ), we find that there exists a critical value, 
4 5 7 6 3
1
2
2 (768 9360 432 3684 21600 7776 21696 43) 2( 0
2
c

               
2 4 3 5 66(1679616 19657728 22624560 5909760 15102144 13818536           
7 9 8 10 12 11 1/28279448 1032280 6610920 1734738 42849 477342 10077696 )            
3 7 6 5 4 9 8 2 1(83788 33067 39852 61760 116824 576 7648 93888 92736 20736)                 
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, when 
12 ( )c c  , (a) 
LE RE  , (b) LE RE  ; otherwise, LE RE  , LE RE  . 
L. Proof of Proposition 8.  
This proof follows from optimal decisions in Lemma 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
(a) Comparing 
R RE R      with L LE L     , we find that there exists a critical 
value,  
9 8 7 6 5 4
13
1
( ) (73728 978944 4232576 5101056 7905280 14953472
2
c r r r r r r      
3 2 10 9 810724864 12017664 11870208 2654208)( 165888 1857024 6924288r r r r r r        
7 6 5 4 3 26107136 17129472 24662016 26087424 23556096 30081024 7962624r r r r r r r        
4 348(123834728448 1180729737216 2411259052032 6041802203136r r r   
7 6 5 915118687095424 11165865072768 16775099375616 7433595964736r r r r   
8 10 14 1318618855245536 14231489629152 1813386025720 1740206450432r r r r     
11 17 15 163204102325312 165219478380 765951670936 190740007966r r r r   
18 22 20 19 21 1/222654457950 16454016 2708248626 6767119788 350581824 ) )r r r r r    
2 1(3 8 8)r r   , when 13( )c c  , 0
R L     ; when 13 10( ) ( )c c c   , 
0 R L     ; when 10 ( )c c  , 0
R L     . 
(b) Comparing 
R RE R    with L LE L   , we find that there exists a critical 
value,
4 8 7 6 5 9 3
14
1
( ) (1568768 87040 398496 512064 779328 6144 1116160
2
c r r r r r r r         
2 4 7 8 6 51318912 1306624 294912)(294912 43392 4608 121344 19968r r r r r r r      
3 2 18 17110592 69120 307200 24( 79488 1392192 127401984 1050181632r r r r r r       
4 3 2 7 6 52424792064 3340107776 3166507008 6639512256 1081918016 7365509120r r r r r r     
9 8 10 14 13 123872791552 1951836624 736945864 102254842 326200624 77091060r r r r r r     
11 15 16 1/21545973096 5900110 7909782 ) )r r r    
when 14 ( )c c  , 0
L R    ; otherwise, 0R L    . 
